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1. Introduction
In computational optimization solving a given problem through a family of auxil-
iary problems, which enjoy better properties and are therefore easier to be solved,
is a widespread approach. Among others, penalty and proximal point algorithms
for nonlinear programs (see, for instance, [1, 2]) fall within this scheme. A quite
general auxiliary principle has been developed in [3, 4] within the framework of
decomposition and coordination algorithms, and it provides sufficient conditions
for an optimal solution of one suitable auxiliary problem to solve the given prob-
lem. This principle was later extended to variational inequalities [5], while the full
equivalence with the auxiliary variational inequality was investigated in [6] and ex-
ploited to develop solution methods through optimization techniques, for instance,
in [6–8]. Quite recently, this kind of approach has been considered also for more
general equilibrium problems (see [9–12]), which include optimization, variational
inequalities, saddle point problems and Nash equilibria in noncooperative games
as particular cases.
In this paper we aim at deepening the analysis of auxiliary principles for equilibria
and we focus on the well-known format (see [13–15]) of an equilibrium problem
find x∗ ∈ C s.t. f(x∗, y) ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ C, (EP)
where C ⊆ Rn is a nonempty, closed and convex set and the equilibrium bifunction
f : Rn × Rn → R is continuous, satisfies f(x, x) = 0 and f(x, ·) is convex for all
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x ∈ Rn. Given any α > 0, the bifunction
fα(x, y) := f(x, y) + α ‖y − x‖2/2
leads to the following auxiliary equilibrium problem
find x∗ ∈ C s.t. fα(x∗, y) ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ C, (EPα)
which is equivalent to (EP ) in the sense that their solution sets coincide [12].
The so-called Minty equilibrium problem (see [13, 16])
find x∗ ∈ C s.t. f(y, x∗) ≤ 0, ∀ y ∈ C, (MEP )
can be viewed as an auxiliary problem as well, since any of its solutions solves also
(EP ) and the solution sets coincide if f is pseudomonotone [16]. Therefore, it is
interesting to consider also the equilibrium problem
find x∗ ∈ C s.t. fα(y, x∗) ≤ 0, ∀ y ∈ C, (MEPα)
in connection with (MEP ) and (EP ), though it did not receive, to the best of
our knowledge, any consideration except for a few papers dealing with variational
inequalities only [6, 17].
The goal of the paper is to analyse in details the conditions that guarantee the
equivalence between (EP ) and each of the above auxiliary problems together with
the properties and advantages that each equivalence brings. A rather novel feature
is the analysis of the case α < 0 for which, up to now, (EPα) has been considered
only for the so-called linear equilibrium problem in [18] while (MEPα) only for
variational inequalities in [6, 17].
Section 2 explores the connections between the convexity and monotonicity prop-
erties of the bifunctions f and fα. Section 3 and Section 4 investigate the relation-
ships of (EP ) with (EPα) and (MEPα), respectively, and the properties of the
corresponding gap functions, which allow to reformulate the equilibrium problems
as optimization programs. Exploiting negative values for α, also new existence re-
sults and error bounds are achieved under weak monotonicity or weak concavity
assumptions on f .
2. Convexity and monotonicity
Both convexity and monotonicity play an important role in the study of equilib-
rium problems and in the development of solution methods. In order to analyse
strong and weak concepts in a unified way, suitable parametric definitions can be
introduced.
Definition 1 Given γ ∈ R, a function g : Rn → R is called γ-convex on C if any
u, v ∈ C and t ∈ [0, 1] satisfy
g(t u+ (1− t) v) ≤ t g(u) + (1− t) g(v)− γ
2
t (1− t) ‖u− v‖2.
g is called γ-concave on C if −g is γ-convex on C.
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If γ = 0, the above inequality provides the usual definition of a convex function. If
γ > 0, the inequality is strengthened and f is also called strongly convex ; similarly,
f is called weakly convex if γ < 0. Indeed, g is γ-convex on C if and only if
g(x)− γ ‖x‖2/2 is convex on C (see [19]).
Definition 2 Given µ ∈ R, the bifunction f is called
– µ-monotone on C if any x, y ∈ C satisfy the inequality
f(x, y) + f(y, x) ≤ −µ ‖y − x‖2;
– µ-pseudomonotone on C if any x, y ∈ C satisfy the implication
f(x, y) ≥ 0 =⇒ f(y, x) ≤ −µ ‖y − x‖2;
– µ-quasimonotone on C if any x, y ∈ C satisfy the implication
f(x, y) > 0 =⇒ f(y, x) ≤ −µ ‖y − x‖2.
Clearly, µ-monotonicity implies µ-pseudomonotonicity, which in turn implies µ-
quasimonotonicity. If µ = 0, the well-known concepts of monotonicity, pseudomono-
tonicity and quasimonotonicity are recovered (see [14, 20–22]). If µ > 0, the re-
quirements are strengthened and the strong counterparts of the above monotonic-
ity concepts defined: strong monotonicity has been often exploited in algorithmic
frameworks (see [13]) while strong pseudomonotonicity has been considered mainly
for variational inequalities (see [23, 24]) and only very recently for more general
equilibrium problems [25]. Similarly, if µ < 0 weaker concepts are introduced: weak
monotonicity has been exploited in a few papers [26–29], while weak pseudomono-
tonicity and weak quasimonotonicity, to the best of our knowledge, are fairly new.
Throughout all the paper we suppose the bifunction f to satisfy the following
convexity assumption:
∃ τ ≥ 0 such that f(x, ·) is τ -convex for any x ∈ C. (1)
If τ = 0, then (1) collapses to the standard assumption of convexity for equilib-
rium problems. Sections 3 and 4 show that new results and features of equilibrium
problems together with improvements of known results can be achieved considering
also the case τ > 0.
Note that variational inequalities, that is (EP ) with
f(x, y) = 〈F (x), y − x〉
for some mapping F : Rn → Rn, satisfy (1) only for τ = 0, while the so-called
linear equilibrium problems (see [18]), that is (EP ) with
f(x, y) = 〈Px+Qy + r, y − x〉 (2)
for some r ∈ Rn and some P,Q ∈ Rn×n, with Q positive semidefinite, satisfy (1)
with τ equal to the minimum eigenvalue of Q+QT . Nash equilibrium problems, in
which each player i selects one strategy from the set Ci ⊆ Rni to minimize a cost
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function ci : C1 × · · · × CN → R, that is (EP ) with C = C1 × · · · × CN and
f(x, y) =
N∑
i=1
[ci(x−i, yi)− ci(x))]
where yi ∈ Ci and (x−i, yi) ∈ C, satisfy (1) with τ = min{τi : i = 1, . . . , N} for τi’s
such that ci(x−i, ·) is a τi-convex function on Ci.
The auxiliary bifunction fα inherits convexity and monotonicity properties from
f in the following way.
Proposition 2.1 (Convexity and monotonicity properties of fα).
a) fα(x, ·) is (τ + α)-convex for any x ∈ C.
b) If f is µ-monotone on C, then fα is (µ− α)-monotone on C.
c) If f is µ-quasimonotone on C and α < 2µ, then fα is (−α/2)-pseudomono-
tone on C.
Proof.
a) Since α ‖y − x‖2/2 is α-convex, it follows directly from [19, Proposition 4.1].
b) fα(x, y) + fα(y, x) = f(x, y) + f(y, x) + α‖y − x‖2 ≤ (α− µ)‖y − x‖2.
c) Take any x, y ∈ C with x 6= y such that fα(x, y) ≥ 0. Then,
f(x, y) ≥ −α ‖y − x‖2/2 > −µ ‖y − x‖2
implies f(y, x) ≤ 0 since f is µ-quasimonotone on C. Hence, the thesis follows
immediately since fα(y, x) = f(y, x) + α ‖y − x‖2/2 ≤ α ‖y − x‖2/2.
The choice of α should be driven by getting fα satisfy better properties than
f . Anyway, there is some kind of tradeoff between convexity and monotonicity:
if α > 0, then fα(x, ·) satisfies a stronger convexity condition than f(x, ·) but f
has stronger monotonicity properties; vice versa, if α < 0, then f(x, ·) satisfies
a stronger convexity condition than fα(x, ·) while fα has stronger monotonicity
properties. For example, consider the case f is monotone and f(x, ·) is convex: fα
is just weakly monotone but fα(x, ·) is strongly convex if α > 0, while fα is strongly
monotone but fα(x, ·) is just weakly convex if α < 0.
Note that if f is quasimonotone, then Proposition 2.1 guarantees that fα is
strongly pseudomonotone if α < 0, but it is not necessarily weakly monotone as
the following example shows.
Example 1 Consider f(x, y) = (x2 + 1) (y − x) and C = (−∞, 0]. Clearly, f is
0-quasimonotone since f(x, y) > 0 implies y > x and thus f(y, x) < 0. However,
both f and fα are not µ-monotone for any µ ∈ R since
[fα(x, y) + fα(y, x)]/(y − x)2 = −(x+ y − α)→ +∞
as x→ −∞ and y → −∞ with x 6= y.
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3. Classical auxiliary problems
The exploitation of (EPα) as an auxiliary problem is rooted in proximal point algo-
rithms for nonlinear optimization. At first it has been often used in the framework
of variational inequalities and afterwards also for other equilibrium problems (see,
for instance, Section 3.1 in [13] and the references therein). Generally, just positive
values of α have been considered. Anyhow, if strong convexity assumptions are
met, i.e., (1) holds for some τ > 0, then it is possible to consider also negative
values as shown by the following auxiliary problem principle.
Theorem 3.1 (Classical auxiliary problem principle).
(EP ) is equivalent to (EPα) for any α ≥ −τ .
Proof. Since f(x, ·) and fα(x, ·) are convex for any x ∈ C, the following equivalences
hold:
x∗ solves (EP )⇐⇒ x∗ ∈ arg min{ f(x∗, y) : y ∈ C }
⇐⇒ ∃ g∗ ∈ ∂yf(x∗, x∗) s.t. 〈g∗, y − x∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ C
⇐⇒ ∃ g∗ ∈ ∂yfα(x∗, x∗) s.t. 〈g∗, y − x∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ C
⇐⇒ x∗ ∈ arg min{ fα(x∗, y) : y ∈ C }
⇐⇒ x∗ solves (EPα)
where ∂yf(x
∗, x∗) denotes the subdifferential of the convex function f(x∗, ·) at
x∗. The first and the last equivalence are obvious consequences of the definition
of (EP ) as f(x, x) = 0 for any x ∈ C, while the second and the fourth are the
optimality conditions of convex programming. Finally, the third equivalence is due
to the equality ∂yfα(x, y) = ∂yf(x, y) + α(y − x) (see [30, Theorem 4.1.1]).
If τ = 0, then the above principle collapses to the well-known one given by Lemma
3.1 in [12], while it has been considered with τ ≥ 0 only for linear equilibrium
problems [18, Lemma 5]. Furthermore, it can be exploited to obtain new existence
and uniqueness results for (EP ), relying on appropriate values of α.
Theorem 3.2 (Existence and uniqueness of solutions).
If any of the following conditions holds:
a) f is µ-monotone on C with µ > −τ ,
b) τ > 0 and f is µ-quasimonotone on C with µ > −τ/2,
then there exists a unique solution of (EP).
Proof. By Theorem 3.1 it is enough to prove the thesis for (EPα) exploiting a
suitable value of α.
a) Choosing any α ∈ [−τ, µ), then Proposition 2.1 guarantees that fα(x, ·) is convex
and fα is strongly monotone on C. Therefore, (EPα) has a unique solution (see
Section 2.2 in [13]).
b) Choosing α ∈ [−τ,min{0, 2µ}), then Proposition 2.1 guarantees that fα(x, ·) is
convex and fα is strongly pseudomonotone on C. Therefore, (EPα) has a unique
solution by Proposition 2.1 in [25].
If τ = 0, then case a) collapses to the well-known existence and uniqueness
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result that exploits the strong monotonicity of f (see, for instance, [13]). It is
worth noting that the weak quasimonotonicity of f is enough to guarantee the
existence of a unique solution of (EP ) if τ > 0. Although the quasimonotonicity
of f has already been exploited to prove existence results (see, for instance, [20]),
to the best of our knowledge no result based on weak quasimonotonicity had been
given in the literature up to now.
Equilibrium problems can be reformulated as optimization programs through
suitable gap functions. Indeed, it is well-known (see, for instance, [10, 11, 31]) that
ϕα(x) := sup{ −fα(x, y) : y ∈ C }
is a gap function for (EP ) for any given α ≥ 0, i.e., ϕα is non-negative on C and x∗
solves (EP ) if and only if x∗ ∈ C and ϕα(x∗) = 0. The auxiliary problem principle
given by Theorem 3.1 allows extending this reformulation of equilibria for suitable
negative values of α if τ > 0.
Theorem 3.3 (Properties of ϕα).
a) ϕα is a gap function for (EP ) for any α ≥ −τ .
b) ϕα(x) < +∞ for any x ∈ C and α > −τ .
c) If f(·, y) is γ-concave on C for any y ∈ C, then ϕα is (γ − α)-convex on C.
Proof.
a) It follows directly from Theorem 3.1.
b) Since α > −τ , fα(x, ·) is strongly convex by Proposition 2.1. Hence, its minimum
value over C, that is −ϕα(x), is finite.
c) Since α ‖y − x‖2/2 is (−α)-concave on C for any y ∈ C, fα(·, y) is (γ − α)-
concave on C by Proposition 2.1. As it is the pointwise supremum of a family
of (γ − α)-convex functions, the gap function ϕα is (γ − α)-convex on C as well
(see [19, Proposition 4.1]).
Notice that it is more likely for ϕα to be convex if α < 0: for instance, whenever
f(·, y) is weakly concave or concave on C, that is γ ≤ 0, ϕα is convex if α ≤ γ,
which does not hold when α > 0. The following example shows a case in which ϕα
is not convex for any α > 0 while convex for some negative values of α.
Example 2 Consider f(x, y) = (−x + 2y + 1)(y − x) and C = [0,+∞): f(x, ·) is
τ -convex with τ = 4, thus ϕα is a gap function for any α ≥ −4. Moreover, it holds
ϕα(x) = (−1− α/2)x2 + x
for α ∈ [−4,−3], while
ϕα(x) =
(−1− α/2)x
2 + x, if x ∈ [0, (3 + α)−1) ,
(x+ 1)2/(8 + 2α), if x ∈ [(3 + α)−1,+∞) ,
for α > −3. Therefore, ϕα is convex on C for any α ∈ [−4,−2], while it is not
convex on C if α > −2. Indeed, f(·, y) is γ-concave with γ = −2 for any y ∈ C.
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If f is strongly monotone on C, the gap function ϕα provides an error bound
for (EP ) whenever α > 0 is small enough (see [11, Proposition 4.2]). If τ > 0,
the use of negative values for α brings further improvements: error bounds can be
established even under weak monotonicity or weak concavity assumptions.
Theorem 3.4 (Error bound).
a) If f is µ-monotone on C with µ > −τ and α ∈ [−τ, µ), then
ϕα(x) ≥ (µ− α) ‖x− x∗‖2, ∀ x ∈ C,
where x∗ is the unique solution of (EP).
b) If f(·, y) is γ-concave on C for any y ∈ C with γ > −τ and α ∈ [−τ, γ), then
ϕα(x) ≥ (γ − α)‖x− x∗‖2/2, ∀ x ∈ C,
where x∗ is the unique solution of (EP).
Proof.
a) By Theorem 3.2 a) there exists a unique solution x∗ of (EP ). Since Theorem 3.1
guarantees the equivalence between (EP ) and (EPα), x
∗ solves (EPα) as well.
Therefore, any x ∈ C satisfies
ϕα(x) ≥ −fα(x, x∗)
= −fα(x, x∗)− fα(x∗, x) + fα(x∗, x)
≥ −fα(x, x∗)− fα(x∗, x)
≥ (µ− α) ‖x− x∗‖2,
where the last inequality holds since fα is (µ−α)-monotone on C by Proposition 2.1.
b) By Theorem 4.2 below there exists a unique solution x∗ of (EP ), and since
α ≥ −τ it minimizes ϕα over C by Theorem 3.3 a). Note that ϕα is strongly
convex on C since it is (γ−α)-convex on C (Theorem 3.3 c)) and α < γ. Therefore,
Theorem 6.1.2 in [30] guarantees that the inequality
ϕα(x) ≥ ϕα(x∗) + 〈g∗, x− x∗〉+ (γ − α)‖x− x∗‖2/2
holds for any x ∈ C and any g∗ ∈ ∂ϕα(x∗). The optimality of x∗ implies ϕα(x∗) = 0
and the existence of some g∗ ∈ ∂ϕα(x∗) such that 〈g∗, x− x∗〉 ≥ 0 for any x ∈ C.
Therefore, the thesis follows.
Theorem 3.4 a) with τ = 0 and µ > 0 has been proved for variational inequalities
in [32] and extended to equilibrium problems in [11]. If τ > 0, then the above result
provides new error bounds under weaker assumptions than the usual ones.
In the case of linear equilibrium problems, that is when f is given by (2), f is
µ-monotone and f(·, y) is γ-concave and the moduli of monotonicity and concavity
are explicitly known: µ and γ are the minimum eigenvalues of (P−Q+(P−Q)T )/2
and P+P T , respectively. As τ is the minimum eigenvalue of Q+QT , the inequality
τ ≥ γ + 2µ always holds as well.
7
4. Minty auxiliary problems
The Minty equilibrium problem (MEP ) has been extensively used as an auxiliary
problem for (EP ) both in order to obtain existence results (see, for instance, [16,
20, 33, 34]) and within algorithmic frameworks (see, for instance, [35–39]). On the
contrary, the analogous equilibrium problem with the regularized bifunction fα
did not receive much attention. Indeed, the class of problems (MEPα) has been
explicitly considered only for variational inequalities with α < 0 in [6, 17] while
indirectly through gap functions with α > 0 in [18, 40]. The following auxiliary
principle provides the relationships between (EP ) and (MEPα) for any value of α.
Theorem 4.1 (Minty auxiliary problem principle).
Any solution of (MEPα) is a solution of (EP). The vice versa is true if any of the
following conditions holds:
a) f is µ-pseudomonotone on C and α ≤ 2µ,
b) f is µ-monotone on C and α ≤ 2µ+ τ ,
c) f(·, y) is γ-concave on C for any y ∈ C with γ ≥ −τ and α ≤ γ.
Proof. Let x∗ be a solution of (MEPα). Given any y ∈ C, consider the point
yt = t y + (1− t)x∗ for t ∈ (0, 1) so that yt ∈ C. The following inequalities hold
0 = f(yt, yt)
≤ t f(yt, y) + (1− t) f(yt, x∗)
≤ t f(yt, y)− α (1− t) ‖yt − x∗‖2/2
= t f(yt, y)− α t2(1− t) ‖y − x∗‖2/2.
The first is due to the convexity of f(yt, ·) while the second holds since x∗ solves
(MEPα). As a consequence, the inequality
f(yt, y) ≥ α t(1− t) ‖y − x∗‖2/2
holds as well. Taking the limit as t ↓ 0, the continuity of f guarantees f(x∗, y) ≥ 0.
Hence, x∗ solves (EP ).
Now, suppose x∗ solves (EP ). The three cases have to be analysed separately.
a) Any y ∈ C satisfies
fα(y, x
∗) = f(y, x∗) + α‖y − x∗‖2/2 ≤ (α/2− µ) ‖y − x∗‖2 ≤ 0
where the first inequality follows from the µ-pseudomonotonicity of f .
b) Any y ∈ C satisfies
fα(y, x
∗) = f(y, x∗) + α‖y − x∗‖2/2
≤ −f(x∗, y) + (α/2− µ) ‖y − x∗‖2
≤ (α/2− µ− τ/2) ‖y − x∗‖2
≤ 0,
where the first inequality is due to the µ-monotonicity of f while the second holds
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since x∗ solves (EP−τ ) by Theorem 3.1 and therefore f(x∗, y) ≥ τ‖y − x∗‖2/2.
c) Consider the bifunction g(x, y) := −fγ(y, x): g(x, ·) is convex for any x ∈ C
since Proposition 2.1 guarantees that fγ(·, x) is concave, and obviously g(x, x) = 0.
Given any y ∈ C, g(y, x∗) = −fγ(x∗, y) ≤ 0 since x∗ solves (EPγ) by Theorem 3.1.
The same argument of the very first part of the proof shows g(x∗, y) ≥ 0 and
therefore fγ(y, x
∗) ≤ 0 holds. Since α ≤ γ, then fα(y, x∗) ≤ fγ(y, x∗) and thus x∗
solves (MEPα).
Theorem 4.1 subsumes some known particular cases together with new results.
Case a) with µ = 0 and α = 0 is the well-known Minty Lemma about the equiva-
lence between (EP ) e (MEP ) (see, for instance, [16]). Case b) with τ = 0, µ > 0
and α = 0 or α = µ was considered in [18]. Considering just variational inequali-
ties (and therefore having τ = 0), case a) with µ = 0 and α ≤ 0 has been proved
in [6, 17], while case b) with µ > 0 and α ≥ 0 in [40, Lemma 2.3]. To the best of our
knowledge, up to now case c) has not been considered in any framework. Moreover,
since µ and γ can be negative, Theorem 4.1 provides further equivalence results,
which just require weak pseudomonotonicity or weak concavity assumptions.
Notice that the auxiliary principles of Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 4.1 are somehow
symmetric: the former needs α to be bounded by below while the latter requires α
to be bounded by above and some monotonicity conditions.
As (MEP ) has been widely used to obtain existence results for (EP ), the aux-
iliary problem (MEPα) can be exploited in the same fashion.
Theorem 4.2 (Existence and uniqueness of solutions).
If f(·, y) is γ-concave on C for any y ∈ C with γ > −τ , then there exists a unique
solution of (EP ).
Proof. Choosing α ∈ (−τ, γ], Proposition 2.1 guarantees that fα(x, ·) is strongly
convex on C and fα(·, y) is concave on C. By Theorem 4.1 it is enough to prove
that there exists a unique solution of (MEPα).
Suppose x∗ solves (MEPα). By Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 3.1 x∗ solves also
(EPα), that is fα(x
∗, y) ≥ 0 for any y ∈ C. Since fα(x∗, ·) is strongly convex on C
and fα(x
∗, x∗) = 0, any y ∈ C with y 6= x∗ satisfies fα(x∗, y) > 0 and thus it does
not solve (MEPα). Therefore, the solution of (MEPα), if any exists, is unique.
Considering the set-valued map M(x) := {y ∈ C : fα(x, y) ≤ 0}, x∗ ∈ C solves
(MEPα) if and only if x
∗ ∈ M(x) for any x ∈ C. Therefore, it is enough to prove
that the intersection of the sets M(x) over all x ∈ C is nonempty.
Given any x ∈ C, M(x) is nonempty, closed and bounded since x ∈ M(x),
f is continuous and fα(x, ·) is strongly convex on C. Therefore, the Knaster-
Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz Theorem [41] guarantees the desired nonemptiness if
k∑
i=1
βix
i ∈
k⋃
i=1
M(xi) (3)
holds for any x1, . . . , xk ∈ C and any β1, . . . , βk ≥ 0 such that β1 + · · · + βk = 1.
Setting z = β1x
1 + · · ·+ βkxk, the concavity of fα(·, z) implies
0 = fα(z, z) ≥
k∑
i=1
βi fα(x
i, z)
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which entails fα(x
j , z) ≤ 0, i.e., z ∈M(xj), for some j. Thus, (3) holds.
In the same way gap function for (EP ) can be introduced through (EPα), the
auxiliary problem (MEPα) can be exploited to introduce another family of gap
functions. Indeed, the function
ψα(x) := sup{ fα(y, x) : y ∈ C }
is non-negative on C and x∗ solves (MEPα) if and only if x∗ ∈ C and ψα(x∗) = 0.
Therefore, ψα is a gap function for (EP ) under the assumptions of Theorem 4.1.
Moreover, unlike the gap function ϕα of the previous section, it is always convex
and this property makes it attractive: in fact, it has been exploited in algorithmic
frameworks both for variational inequalities [6, 17, 35, 37] and for more general
equilibrium problems [18, 38]. The following result groups its main properties.
Theorem 4.3 (Properties of ψα).
a) ψα is a gap function for (EP) if any of the assumptions of Theorem 4.1 holds.
b) ψα(x) < +∞ for any x ∈ C if any of the following conditions holds:
b1) f(·, y) is γ-concave on C for any y ∈ C and α < γ,
b2) f is µ-monotone on C and α < 2µ+ τ .
c) ψα is (τ + α)-convex on C for any α ≥ −τ .
Proof.
a) ψα is a gap function for (EP ) whenever (MEPα) is equivalent to (EP ).
b1) Proposition 2.1 guarantees that fα(·, x) is (γ−α)-concave for any x ∈ C. Since
γ > α, fα(·, x) is strongly concave, thus its maximum value over C, that is ψα(x),
is finite.
b2) The µ-monotonicity of f implies
fα(y, x) ≤ −f(x, y) + (α/2− µ) ‖y − x‖2 = −f2µ−α(x, y).
Proposition 2.1 guarantees that f2µ−α(x, ·) is (τ + 2µ − α)-convex, hence
−f2µ−α(x, ·) is (τ + 2µ − α)-concave. Since τ + 2µ > α, it is actually strongly
concave and thus its maximum value over C is finite, which implies that ψα(x) is
finite as well.
c) Since α ‖y− x‖2/2 is α-convex on C for any y ∈ C, fα(y, ·) is (τ +α)-convex on
C by Proposition 2.1. As it is the pointwise supremum of a family of (τ+α)-convex
functions, the gap function ψα is (τ +α)-convex on C as well (see [19, Proposition
4.1]).
Theorem 4.3 a) has been already given in [6, 17, 18, 40] for the same particular
cases of Theorem 4.1 that have been previously recalled. Also Theorem 3.3 and
Theorem 4.3 are somehow symmetric: considering any α > −τ , ϕα is a finite gap
function for (EP ) but it is convex only under additional assumptions, while ψα
is convex but it is a finite gap function for (EP ) only under additional assump-
tions; moreover, γ-concavity provides a common assumption to get convexity in
Theorem 3.3 and finiteness in Theorem 4.3.
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Also the gap function ψα can be exploited to obtain error bounds for (EP ). Since
it is always convex, some bounds can be achieved also under pseudomonotonicity
assumptions.
Theorem 4.4 (Error bound).
If any of the following conditions holds:
a) f is µ-pseudomonotone on C with µ > −τ/2 and α ∈ (−τ, 2µ],
b) f is µ-monotone on C with µ > −τ and α ∈ (−τ, 2µ+ τ ],
c) f(·, y) is γ-concave on C for any y ∈ C with γ > −τ and α ∈ (−τ, γ].
then ψα is a strongly convex gap function for (EP ) and
ψα(x) ≥ (τ + α)‖x− x∗‖2/2, ∀ x ∈ C,
where x∗ is the unique solution of (EP ).
Proof. In case c) the existence of a unique solution of (EP ) is guaranteed by
Theorem 4.2. In the cases a) and b) it is guaranteed by Proposition 2.1 in [25] if
τ = 0 and by Theorem 3.2 if τ > 0.
By Theorem 4.3 ψα is a (τ+α)-convex gap function for (EP ), hence it is strongly
convex and ψα(x
∗) = 0. Any x ∈ C satisfies
ψα(x) ≥ fα(x∗, x) = f(x∗, x) + α‖x− x∗‖2/2 ≥ (τ + α)‖x− x∗‖2/2,
where the second inequality holds since x∗ solves (EP−τ ) by Theorem 3.1 and
therefore f(x∗, x) ≥ τ‖x− x∗‖2/2.
Theorem 4.4 b) with τ = 0 and µ > 0 has been proved for variational inequalities
in [40, Lemma 4.2], while all the other cases are, to the best of our knowledge, new.
Notice that the use of negative values for α (which is possible if τ > 0) provides error
bounds also under weak (pseudo)monotonicity or weak concavity assumptions.
5. Conclusions
The paper investigates in depth the relations of the equilibrium problem (EP )
with two different families of auxiliary problems: classical auxiliary problems (EPα)
and Minty auxiliary problems (MEPα), which both depend upon a regularization
parameter α.
Exploiting parametric definitions of strong/weak convexity and monotonicity,
results are presented in a unified form that allows subsuming known particular
cases together with new results. Indeed, the results require precise relations be-
tween α and the moduli of monotonoticity and convexity/concavity. This kind of
analysis has been the key tool for improvements: for instance, only τ = 0 holds for
variational inequalities and therefore only positive values for α are useful in their
particular framework; anyway, other equilibrium problems may satisfy τ > 0, thus
allowing α to take negative values that lead to existence results and error bounds
under weaker assumptions.
Relying on this approach, auxiliary problem principles are investigated both for
positive and negative values of α. The equivalence between (EP ) and (EPα) was
already well-known for α > 0, yet the analysis for negative values is new, while the
equivalence between (EP ) and (MEPα) was already well-known just for α = 0 in
the pseudomonotone case. These principles lead to new existence results for (EP )
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under weak quasimonotonicity or weak concavity assumptions. Furthermore, the
auxiliary problems (EPα) and (MEPα) with suitable choices of α bring in gap
functions ϕα and ψα with good convexity properties and new error bounds follow
as well. Table 1 provides an overview of the monotonicity or concavity conditions
that guarantee the properties of the gap functions and the corresponding error
bounds.
Table 1. Conditions that guarantee properties of the gap functions ϕα and ψα.
ϕα ψα
f µ-pseudomonotone, α ≤ 2µ
or
gap function α ≥ −τ f µ-monotone, α ≤ 2µ+ τ
or
f(·, y) γ-concave with γ ≥ −τ , α ≤ γ
convex f(·, y) γ-concave, α ≤ γ α ≥ −τ
strongly convex f(·, y) γ-concave, α < γ α > −τ
f µ-pseudomonotone, α ∈ (−τ, 2µ]
f is µ-monotone, α ∈ [−τ, µ) or
error bound or f µ-monotone, α ∈ (−τ, 2µ+ τ ]
f(·, y) γ-concave, α ∈ [−τ, γ) or
f(·, y) γ-concave, α ∈ (−τ, γ]
References
[1] Boukari D, Fiacco AV. Survey of penalty, exact-penalty and multipliers methods from
1968 to 1993. Optimization. 1995;32:301–334.
[2] Parikh N, Boyd S. Proximal algorithms. Foundations and Trends in Optimization.
2013;1:12–231.
[3] Cohen G. Optimization by decomposition and coordination: a unified approach. IEEE
T Automat Contr, Special Issue on Large-Scale Systems. 1978;AC-23:222–232.
[4] Cohen G. Auxiliary problem principle and decomposition of optimization problems.
J Optim Theory Appl. 1980;32:277–305.
[5] Cohen G. Auxiliary problem principle extended to variational inequalities. J Optim
Theory Appl. 1988;59:325–333.
[6] Mastroeni G. Minimax and extremum problems associated to a variational inequality.
Rend Circ Mat Palermo. 1999;58:185–196.
[7] Fukushima M. Equivalent differentiable optimization problems and descent methods
for asymmetric variational inequality problems. Math Program. 1992;53:99–110.
[8] Zhu DL, Marcotte P. An extended descent framework for variational inequalities. J
Optim Theory Appl. 1994;80:349–366.
[9] Castellani M, Giuli M. On equivalent equilibrium problems. J Optim Theory Appl.
2010;147:157–168.
[10] Chadli O, Konnov IV, Yao JC. Descent methods for equilibrium problems in a Banach
space. Comput Math Appl. 2004;48:609–616.
[11] Mastroeni G. Gap functions for equilibrium problems. J Global Optim. 2003;27:411–
426
[12] Mastroeni G. On auxiliary principle for equilibrium problems. In: Daniele P, Giannessi
F, Maugeri A, editors. Equilibrium problems and variational models. Norwell: Kluwer
Academic; 2003. p. 289–298.
12
[13] Bigi G, Castellani M, Pappalardo M, Passacantando M. Existence and solution meth-
ods for equilibria. European J Oper Res. 2013;227:1–11.
[14] Blum E, Oettli W. From optimitazion and variational inequalities to equilibrium prob-
lems. Math Student. 1994;63:123–145.
[15] Muu LD, Oettli W. Convergence of an adaptive penalty scheme for finding constrained
equilibria. Nonlinear Anal. 1992;18:1159–1166.
[16] Iusem AN, Sosa W. New existence results for equilibrium problems. Nonlinear Anal.
2003;52:621–635.
[17] Mastroeni G. Gap functions and descent methods for Minty variational inequality.
In: Qi L, Teo K, Yang X, editors. Optimization and Control with Applications. New
York: Springer; 2005.
[18] Quoc TD, Muu LD, Iterative methods for solving monotone equilibrium problems via
dual gap functions. Comput Optim Appl. 2012;51:709–728.
[19] Vial J-P. Strong and weak convexity of sets and functions. Math Oper Res. 1983;8:231–
259.
[20] Bianchi M, Pini R. Coercivity conditions for equilibrium problems. J Optim Theory
Appl. 2005;124:79–92.
[21] Bianchi M, Schaible S. Generalized monotone bifunctions and equilibrium problems.
J Optim Theory Appl. 1996;90:31–43.
[22] Bigi G, Passacantando M. Twelve monotonicity conditions arising from algorithms for
equilibrium problems. Optim Methods Softw. DOI: 10.1080/10556788.2014.900552.
[23] El Farouq N. Pseudomonotone variational inequalities: convergence of the auxiliary
problem method. J Optim Theory Appl. 2001;111:305–326.
[24] Karamardian S, Schaible S. Seven kinds of monotone maps. J Optim Theory Appl.
1990;66:37–46.
[25] Muu LD, Nguyen VQ. On equilibrium problems involving strongly pseu-
domonotone bifunctions. Preprint, Optimization online: http://www.optimization-
online.org/DB HTML/2013/07/3947.html (07/05/2013).
[26] Iusem AN, Sosa W. On the proximal point method for equilibrium problems in Hilbert
spaces. Optimization. 2010;59:1259–1274.
[27] Konnov IV. Application of the proximal point method to nonmonotone equilibrium
problems. J Optim Theory Appl. 2003;119:317–333.
[28] Konnov IV. Partial proximal point method for nonmonotone equilibrium problems.
Optim Methods Softw. 2006;21:373–384.
[29] Mashreghi J, Nasri M. Strong convergence of an inexact proximal point algorithm
for equilibrium problems in Banach spaces. Numer Funct Anal Optim. 2010;31:1053–
1071.
[30] Hiriart-Urruty J-B, Lemare´chal C. Convex analysis and minimization algorithms I.
Berlin: Springer; 1993.
[31] Konnov IV, Ali MSS. Descent methods for monotone equilibrium problems in Banach
spaces. J Comput Appl Math. 2006;188:165–179.
[32] Taji K, Fukushima M, Ibaraki T. A globally convergent Newton method for solving
strongly monotone variational inequalities. Math Program. 1993;58:369–383.
[33] Flores-Bazan F. Existence theorems for generalized noncoercive equilibrium problems:
the quasi-convex case. SIAM J Optim. 2000;11:675–690.
[34] Iusem AN, Kassay G, Sosa W. On certain conditions for the existence of solutions of
equilibrium problems. Math Program. 2009;116:259–273.
[35] Bigi G, Panicucci B. A successive linear programming algorithm for nonsmooth mono-
tone variational inequalities. Optim. Methods Softw. 2010;25:29–35.
[36] Iusem AN, Sosa W. Iterative algorithms for equilibrium problems. Optimization.
2003;52:301–316.
[37] Nguyen S, Dupuis C. An efficient method for computing traffic equilibria in networks
with asymmetric transportation costs, Transportation Sci. 1984;18:185–202.
[38] Quoc TD, Anh PN, Muu LD. Dual extragradient algorithms extended to equilibrium
problems, J Global Optim. 2012;52:139–159.
[39] Raupp FMP, Sosa W. An analytic center cutting plane algorithm for finding equilib-
13
rium points. RAIRO Oper Res. 2006;40:37–52.
[40] Yamashita N, Fukushima M. Equivalent unconstrained minimization and global error
bounds for variational inequality problems. SIAM J Control Optim. 1997;35:273–284.
[41] Knaster B, Kuratowski C, Mazurkiewicz S. Ein Beweies des Fixpunktsatzes fu¨r n-
Dimensionale Simplexe, Fund Math. 1929;14:132–137.
14
